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THE NEW COMMON LAW 
COURTS, CULTURE, AND THE LOCALIZATION OF THE MODEL PENAL 
CODE 
 
 
ANDERS WALKER♦ 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Few tropes in American law teaching are more firmly 
entrenched than the criminal law division between Model Penal 
Code and common law states.  Yet, even a cursory look at current 
state codes indicates that this bifurcation is outmoded.  No state 
continues to cling to ancient English common law, nor does any 
state adhere fully to the Model Penal Code.  In fact, those states 
that adopted portions of the Code have since produced a substantial 
body of case law – what this article terms “new common law” – 
transforming it.  Taking the controversial position that criminal law 
pedagogy is antiquated, this article proposes a radical update, 
emphasizing two objectives: 1) the need to stress the interplay 
between individual state cases and codes, and 2) the need to 
abandon the position that the MPC represents a bold new vision of 
criminal law reform, particularly since that vision is itself almost 
half a century old.  
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 To illustrate, this article will proceed in four parts.  Part I 
interrogates the myth of the “common law” state, showing how 
few, if any states continue to abide by judicially created law 
heralding from Elizabethan England.  Part II interrogates the myth 
of the Model Penal Code state, showing how no state adopted the 
MPC in its entirety nor did any state adopt its most ambitious 
reforms, making the study of the MPC as a free-standing code 
misleading.  Part III looks even closer at so-called MPC states, 
showing how every state that did adopt portions of the Model 
Penal Code has since developed its own, new common law 
interpreting it.  Part IV examines the theoretical implications of 
looking more closely at the new common law, arguing that it leads 
to a more precise pedagogy, as well as a more empirically-minded, 
culturally-rooted understanding of how the criminal law actually 
works.   
 At its core, American criminal law reflects a sedimentary 
deposit of localized, state-level, majoritarian politics.  While 
scholars like William J. Stuntz have derided such politics, even 
criticizing them as “pathological,” this paper argues that they are in 
fact an inevitable symptom of democratic rule.1  To rail against 
them, this piece maintains, is at once anti-democratic and futile.  
Even if the drafting of criminal legislation were handed over to 
politically insulated experts, as scholars like William Stuntz and 
Paul Robinson argue it should be, judges would still bend that law 
to conform to majority will, imposing a new common law onto 
even the most politically insulated, utilitarian of codes.2  
 Underlying this article’s endorsement of a new common 
law approach to criminal law lies a larger challenge to the political 
and pedagogical assumptions underlying legal education generally 
in the United States.  Perhaps foremost among these assumptions is 
the notion that state and local law is somehow less significant, less 
interesting, and ultimately less worthy of attention than national 
law.3  Put simply, whenever national law can be taught, it is, and 
whenever national law cannot be taught – because it does not exist 
– then fictional models are used.4  Though convenient for scholars 
                                                 
1
 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505 (2001). 
2
 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating 
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 640 (2005). 
3
 Russell Covey, “Should We Stop Teaching the Model Penal Code?” July 25, 
2006, prawfsblawg.com; Douglas Berman, THE MODEL PENAL CODE SECOND: 
MIGHT FILM SCHOOLS BE IN NEED OF A REMAKE 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 
(2004). 
4
 Russell Covey, “Should We Stop Teaching the Model Penal Code?” July 25, 
2006, prawfsblawg.com; Douglas Berman, THE MODEL PENAL CODE SECOND: 
MIGHT FILM SCHOOLS BE IN NEED OF A REMAKE 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 
(2004). 
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who look down on state law as inferior, such an approach leads to 
imprecision and, this article maintains, a false sense of law’s very 
nature. 
 For example, most casebook authors presume that the fields 
of psychology and utilitarian philosophy are best suited for 
explaining criminal law and guiding criminal law reform.5  Implicit 
in such an approach, however, is the view that democratic 
majorities do not, in fact, know what is best for them.  Indeed, 
some criminal law scholars have made this point explicit, arguing 
for the de-politicization of the criminal law-making process.6  
 While criminal law casebooks reinforce the notion that 
electoral majorities are inept, few fields of legal practice rely more 
heavily on a lawyer’s ability to understand local majority 
sentiment than criminal law.7  Whether experts disprove of average 
people or not, it is average people who decide the outcome of 
criminal cases, and consequently it is average people who inform 
an attorney’s decision to proceed to trial or accept a plea bargain.8  
Further, until the moment that criminal law scholars succeed in 
overturning democratic government, average people retain the 
power to change the law through the electoral process.9  Rather 
than emphasize abstract theory then, law students should be 
exposed to the methodologies of legal history and legal 
anthropology, both of which focus on the ascertainment and 
analysis of local practice, local knowledge, and local, community 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (5th ed. 
2009); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2005); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, 
ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(5th ed. 2004); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. 
& PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E. DIX AND M. 
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002); 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND 
QUESTIONS (3rd ed. 2001). 
6
 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating 
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 640 (2005). 
7
 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson 
Thinks is Just: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control 86 VIRGINIA L. REV. 
1839 (2000).  
8
 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson 
Thinks is Just: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control 86 VIRGINIA L. REV. 
1839 (2000). 
9
 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson 
Thinks is Just: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control 86 VIRGINIA L. REV. 
1839 (2000). 
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norms.10  Unless criminal law scholars accept the relevance of such 
methodologies to the explication of their field, law students will 
find themselves increasingly deprived of even a basic 
understanding of how judicial opinions and legislative actions 
operate together to construct and reconstruct criminal offenses.  
    
 
 
I. THE MYTH OF THE COMMON LAW STATE 
  
 One of the most pervasive shibboleths of American 
criminal law courses is the common law state.11  Criminal law 
casebooks, hornbooks, and even commercial outlines all agree that 
while some states can best be characterized as Model Penal Code 
states, others are best designated common law.12  Yet, few agree on 
what precisely this means.  According to criminal law scholar 
Joshua Dressler, for example, common law states originally 
followed judge-made crimes deriving from England.13  Yet, 
Dressler argues, “most states, often by statute, have abolished 
common law crimes,” meaning that even in so-called common law 
states, “the legislature is the pre-eminent lawmaking body in the 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g. Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, in JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (5th ed. 2009); 
CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(2005); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG, 
GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2004); 
RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W. 
LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: 
CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E. DIX AND M. MICHAEL 
SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002); WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (3rd ed. 
2001); RONALD N. BOYCE, DONALD A. DRIPPS AND ROLLIN M. PERKINS, 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (9th ed. 2004). 
11
 See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (noting 
distinctions between common law and Model Penal Code states on the topics of 
mistake, proximate cause, duress, necessity, attempt, conspiracy, and 
accomplice liability); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd 
ed. 2010); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 31 (3rd ed. 
2001) (considering in detail both the common law and the Model Penal Code). 
12
 See, e.g., STEVEN L. EMANUEL, CRIMINAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (noting 
distinctions between common law and Model Penal Code states on the topics of 
mistake, proximate cause, duress, necessity, attempt, conspiracy, and 
accomplice liability); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd 
ed. 2010); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 31 (3rd ed. 
2001) (considering in detail both the common law and the Model Penal Code).  
13
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 27 (3rd ed. 2001) (noting 
that pursuant to English common law “the definitions of crimes and the rules of 
criminal responsibility were promulgated by courts rather than by Parliament.”) 
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realm of criminal law,” and that courts do not originate law so 
much as interpret it.14  
 If legislatures are the “pre-eminent” lawmaking bodies in 
America, why bother with the fiction of the common law state?  
According to some, even though all states boast a criminal code, 
some have nevertheless “retained” respect for the ancient common 
law, particularly in cases where common law crimes are not 
mentioned in state codes.15 If a state has a “reception” statute, in 
other words, then prosecutors can successfully charge defendants 
with crimes that are not enumerated in their state’s criminal 
statutes so long as those crimes are mentioned in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries or relate to “an English case directly on point 
decided before 1607.”16 
 How often does this happen?  According to Joshua 
Dressler, such prosecutions are “rare.”17  Criminal law scholar 
Wayne R. LaFave agrees, noting that prosecutions for common 
law crimes are not only few and far between, but have tended to 
involve idiosyncratic, nineteenth century-style offenses, including 
for example “being a common scold,” “maliciously killing a 
horse,” and “burning a body in a cellar furnace.”18   
 Given their rarity, do reception statutes warrant the 
attention of first year criminal law students, whose task it is to gain 
an introduction to the most important aspects of the criminal law?  
Probably not, particularly since the vast majority of states reject 
them.  However, there remains one more reason why the 
pedagogical trope of the common law state may exist.  According 
to Joshua Dressler, some states have rejected reception statutes but 
still “codified the common law felonies,” meaning that they 
employ common law terms to explicate their criminal statutes.19  
Hence, it is important to retain some memory of the common law, 
presumably so that one can understand the law in those states that 
codified the common law.  
 Is this really true?  As this section will demonstrate, most 
crimes enumerated in American state codes, including classic 
common law crimes like murder, possess just as many 
distinguishing American characteristics as English ones, rendering 
arguments that American students need to understand ancient 
English common law nonsensical.  Indeed, this section posits that 
the only unifying factor shared by so-called common law states is 
                                                 
14
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (3rd ed. 2001). 
15
 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd ed. 2010) (noting 
that some states continue to accept the ancient common law of England “either 
by an express ‘reception statute’ or without the aid of any statute.”) 
16
 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2nd ed. 2010). 
17
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (3rd ed. 2001). 
18
 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 67 (2nd ed. 2010) 
19
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 28 (3rd ed. 2001). 
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not whether they preserved retention statutes or codified the 
common law, but that they rejected the MPC.  Currently, only 
fifteen states in the union refused to incorporate any portion of the 
Model Penal Code into their statutory criminal law, making all but 
one of them, by default, “common law states.”20  Included are 
California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming, and 
Louisiana.21  The last state, Louisiana, derives its code directly 
from French civil law, meaning that it is perhaps best described as 
an indigenous, non-MPC code state than a common law state.22 
 Perhaps ironically, the remaining fourteen states that 
rejected the MPC are all perhaps better described as indigenous 
code states than common law states.  To illustrate, it is helpful to 
look at how those fourteen states that did not adopt the MPC treat 
homicide.23  Under English common law, murder was not divided 
into degrees, but rather included simple distinctions between 
intentional killings done with “malice aforethought,” and 
unintentional killings, or manslaughter.24  Yet, out of the fifteen 
                                                 
20
 For a compilation of states that adopted the Model Penal Code, see Dannye 
Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on 
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the 
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 n. 2 (1997). 
21
 For a compilation of states that adopted the Model Penal Code, see Dannye 
Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on 
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the 
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 n. 2 (1997). 
22
 Id.  
23
 Under English common law, murder originally applied to both intentional and 
unintentional killings.  In the 1820s, however, Parliament enacted a statute 
carving out an exception to murder for cases where defendants claimed benefit 
of clergy, creating the statutory lesser-included offense of manslaughter.  JOHN 
H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER, BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
620 (2009).  (Describing 9 Geo. IV c. 31, s.9). WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONGS 216 (Malcom 
Kerr, ed., 1962). While law professors may say that British statutes should be 
considered part of the British common law because they come from England, 
this confuses the notion of what precisely, the common law is.  Is it judge-made 
or is it English?  Casebook authors maintain that it was judge-made, but in many 
cases it was not.  This means that it is probably better to think of it simply as 
English law.  Yet, if it is simply English law, then why not distinguish between 
English law – statutory and judge-made – and American law?  Of course, to 
concede that there may have been an American criminal law that preceded the 
Model Penal Code would undermine the assumption, implicit in American 
casebooks, that pre-MPC law was an archaic remnant of the eighteenth century, 
much in need of an overhaul.  However, core aspects of American “common 
law” regimes are decidedly American innovations, with little antecedent in 
either English law or judge-made law.  
24
 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF 
PUBLIC WRONGS 216 (Malcom Kerr, ed., 1962).  Incidentally, the history of the 
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states that rejected the Model Penal Code, only six employ the 
English common law term “malice aforethought.”25 
 Of those states that continue to employ malice 
aforethought, all but one (South Carolina), divide the offense into 
first and second degrees, something the English common law did 
not do, and subsequently rely on uniquely American language to 
ascertain what, precisely, constitutes murder.26  The most common 
language cited comes from Pennsylvania, which divided murder 
and manslaughter into degrees in 1794, declaring that any killing 
done in a “willful, deliberate, or premeditated” manner warranted 
classification as murder in the first degree.27  
 While criminal law casebooks and hornbooks concede that 
Pennsylvania has influenced many American states, they continue 
to cling to the common law divide, omitting any discussion of 
additional non-judge made criteria that so-called common law 
states use to determine what precisely constitutes first degree 
murder.28  For example, Rhode Island declares that “[t]he unlawful 
                                                                                                                                                 
crime of murder in England raises questions about the extent to which even 
English “common law” was court-generated.  Prior to the reign of Edward III, 
for example, murder in England focused primarily on the killing of Danes by 
English natives, a crime for which entire communities could be punished.  
Edward changed this policy by statute, introducing the current definition of 
killing by “malice aforethought.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND OF PUBLIC WRONGS 217 (Malcom Kerr, ed., 1962).   
25
 The six states are California, Rhode Island, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
Massachusetts, and South Carolina.  California actually incorporated malice 
aforethought after it adopted New York’s Penal Code in 1872.  See Sanford H. 
Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical Antecedents 19 RUTGERS L.J. 521, 
537 (1988). Wyoming uses its own language, combining the Pennsylvania 
models premeditation with the English common law’s malice aforethought: 6-2-
101.  Murder in the first degree; penalty.(a)  Whoever purposely and with 
premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 
sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, 
resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) 
years, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree. 
26
 The only state that does not divide murder into first and second degrees is 
South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. §16-3-10 (2009). 
27
 Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of 
Murder 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1949).  
28
 See, e.g. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 503-04, 508-11 
(2001) JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (5th 
ed. 2009); CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2005); MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); PAUL H. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES (2005); JOHN KAPLAN, 
ROBERT WEISBERG, GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(5th ed. 2004); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. 
& PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2004); LLOYD L WEINREB, CRIMINAL 
LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 2003); GEORGE E. DIX AND M. 
MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed., 2002); 
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killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder,” a 
nod to English common law, but then goes on to distinguish first 
degree murder by including instances where a killing is committed 
“against any law enforcement officer in the performance of his or 
her duty or committed against an assistant attorney general or 
special assistant attorney general in the performance of his or her 
duty.”29  This last provision, protecting prosecutors and police, is 
neither a product of the Pennsylvania model nor the English 
common law, but is a unique consequence of the legislative and 
political history of Rhode Island. 
 Nevada is similar.  Even while clinging to malice 
aforethought for murder generally, Nevada distinguishes first 
degree murder by limiting it to cases where the killing is 
“[c]ommitted in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of 
sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, invasion of 
the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual molestation of a child 
under the age of 14 years, child abuse or abuse of an older person 
or vulnerable person.”30  While many of the above fall under the 
doctrine of felony murder, this does not necessarily mean that they 
therefore derive from the common law of England.  Indeed, 
criminal law scholar Guyora Binder has shown that felony murder 
does not in fact derive from England at all, meaning that it is just 
as much an American doctrine as a British one.31  Further, 
Nevada’s additional provisions for first degree murder are also 
American.  For example, first degree murder includes killings that 
take place “on the property of a public or private school, at an 
activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus 
while the bus was engaged in its official duties” are not English 
either.32  Such attendant circumstances are not products of English 
common law, forged in an era long before children rode buses to 
school – but unique circumstances in Nevada.  
 Similarly unique circumstances rear their heads in other 
states as well.  In Massachusetts, for example,  any killing done 
with “deliberately premeditated malice aforethought” – an odd 
combination of the Pennsylvania and common law definitions – is 
first degree murder, as well as any killing committed “with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.”33  In Oklahoma, first degree murder 
includes any killing done with malice aforethought as well as any 
                                                                                                                                                 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND 
QUESTIONS (3rd ed. 2001). 
29
 R. I. GEN. LAWS  § 11-23-1 (2009).   
30
 NEV. REV. STAT. §200.030 (2009). 
31
 Guyora Binder, The Origins of the American Felony Murder Rule, 57 
STANFORD L. REV. 59 (2004) (recovering the American origins of the felony 
murder rule).  
32
 NEV. REV. STAT. §200.030 
33
 MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 265 § 1 (2009). 
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killing done in conjunction with child abuse, a particularly 
despicable crime for which a different mens rea term is used: “the 
willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of 
unreasonable force” on a child.34   
 California also distinguishes between first and second 
degree murder by attendant circumstances, including whether 
killing was done “by means of discharging a firearm from a motor 
vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with 
the intent to inflict death.”35  This statute was enacted in 1993 after 
a string of drive-by shootings in Los Angeles during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.36  Republican Governor Pete Wilson supported 
the law, and even gang-members themselves attempted to stop the 
practice.37  Only a few months after the statute’s enactment, for 
example, two hundred members of Los Angeles area “warring 
gangs” called for a stop to drive-by shootings, some threatening 
shooters with retribution in prison.38  The Mexican Mafia, known 
simply as “La EME” or “the letter M,” “ordered thousands of 
Latino gang members to halt drive-by shootings" in the Los 
Angeles area.39 
 Though California’s drive-by statute reflects a particular 
aspect of local culture in Los Angeles, criminal law casebooks 
continue to portray California as a common law state, implying 
that it somehow continues to adhere to English common law.  On 
the contrary, however, California’s clear allusion to gang-related 
violence represents the kind of unique circumstance that 
distinguishes American from English law.  To tell students that 
murder in each of these states is based simply on ancient English 
notions of malice aforethought is wrong.  
 Despite malice aforethought’s continued presence in 
American casebooks, most so-called common law states do not 
employ the term at all, making its pedagogical relevance even 
more questionable. To take just a few examples, Idaho, also 
presumably a common law state, incorporated the Pennsylvania 
model but, unlike California, rejected the term malice 
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aforethought, adding instead a series of its own mens rea 
components, including murder done with the “intent” to “execute 
vengeance,” “extort something from the victim,” or “satisfy some 
sadistic inclination,” none of which appeared in the English 
common law.40  Vermont, another common law state, also rejected 
malice aforethought, but included none of the additional mens rea 
requirements that emerged in California or Idaho, simply relying 
on “willful, premeditated, and deliberate killing.”41  Mississippi 
drafted first degree murder to include killing “done with deliberate 
design,” a unique rendition of the Pennsylvania model.42  In 
Vermont and Michigan, murder must be committed “by wilful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing, again direct takes on the 
Pennsylvania model.43 
 While the tired pedagogical technique of using malice 
aforethought as a foil for the MPC only applies to six states – and 
therefore should be brought to an end – defenders of the common 
law fiction will invariably mention South Carolina, the only state 
that does not divide murder into degrees, as a living, if lonely, 
embodiment of England’s legacy.  Yet, even South Carolina 
includes within its definition of murder uniquely American 
language, including “[k]illing by stabbing or thrusting,” a capital 
crime applicable to instances where the victim “has not then any 
weapon drawn” or “has not then first stricken” the defendant.44  Of 
course, there is a statutory exception for anyone who happens to 
cause death while “chastising or correcting his child,” rendering 
the stabbing manslaughter.45   
 Is murder the only area where so-called “common law 
states” depart significantly from the ancient English common law?  
No. While most criminal law casebooks recognize the 
Pennsylvania innovation when it comes to murder, they fail to 
discuss similar grading schemes, all uniquely American, that apply 
to other offenses.46  For example, American states developed 
grading schemes for most violent felonies, not just murder, in the 
nineteenth century.  By 1857, for example, the New York 
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legislature had graded the offenses of burglary, arson, and robbery, 
substantially transforming the common law definitions of each.47    
 Interestingly, Pennsylvania did not grade its violent non-
homicide felonies until after New York, while New York did not 
grade murder until 1860, over half a century after Pennsylvania.48  
Therefore, to say that New York followed the Pennsylvania model 
would not be entirely correct, since it graded its violent felonies 
prior to the Quaker state.  In fact, as regards felonies other than 
murder, it would probably be more correct to say that Pennsylvania 
followed New York, for by the time that New York had graded its 
felonies, Pennsylvania still only graded murder.49  Just as there was 
a Pennsylvania model for murder, in other words, so too was there 
arguably a separate, New York model for burglary, arson, and 
robbery, one that so-called common law states have all tended to 
follow. 
 Other crimes also reflect the failure of so-called common 
law states to follow English common law, statutory rape perhaps 
foremost among them.50  Inspired by a 1576 statute enacted in 
Elizabethan England, for example, North Carolina established  the 
age of consent for statutory rape at 10 in 1869.51  By 1917, 
however, North Carolina raised this age to 12, increasing it again 
to 16 in 1923.52  Rather than a faithful representation of ancient 
English common law, in other words, the Tarheel State’s age of 
consent reflected insecurities about teenage behavior immediately 
after World War I, the height of the jazz age.53 
 Even states that did not adopt the MPC – what scholars call 
common law states – participated in the process of codification and 
transformation.54  Massachusetts provides an example.  By 1857, 
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Massachusetts had codified the crime of kidnapping to include 
“forcibly carrying” persons against their will “out of the state” and, 
also, “secretly confining or imprisoning” any person “against 
[their] will.”55  This latter portion, the act of confining, had not 
been considered by English common law to have been kidnapping, 
but false imprisonment.56  Why Massachusetts decided to 
incorporate false imprisonment into its statute on kidnapping is not 
clear, though the innovation caught on in other common law states 
like Idaho, which includes in its statute anyone who “confines” a 
victim “secretly,” even as it follows the non-common law practice 
of grading.57 
 Perhaps because American kidnapping confuses the 
English common law concept of false imprisonment, it is not 
discussed at length in criminal law casebooks.  Yet, even crimes 
that are mentioned in criminal law casebooks have been altered in 
common law states.  To take another example, North Carolina, one 
of the states commonly cited as a common law state, significantly 
altered the English common law definition of rape by refusing to 
require that victims forcibly resist their attackers.  In cases where 
victims suffered from “fear, fright, or coercion,” noted North 
Carolina’s Supreme Court in 1946, a showing of actual force by 
the defendant was not necessary.58   
 Keeping the above examples in mind, why do criminal law 
professors, and criminal law casebooks, persist in the fiction of the 
common law state?59  Part of the story lies in the politics of legal 
pedagogy.  Prior to 1940, criminal law casebooks consisted – as 
their names suggest – almost entirely of cases.  Renowned criminal 
law teachers like Chicago Professor Joseph Henry Beale included 
anywhere from six to nine cases per topic in their casebooks, 
occluding any mention of law review articles, philosophical 
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treatises, or sociological studies.60  This meant that before a student 
covered a subject, say provocation or self-defense, she – or more 
likely he – walked through at least six factual scenarios, and six 
legal conclusions, from which said student could then synthesize a 
formal legal rule.61   
 Beginning in the 1930s, a young Columbia law professor 
named Herbert Wechsler began to change this.62  Convinced that 
Beale’s case method tended to produce overly conservative, 
narrow-minded attorneys, Wechsler worked with a colleague, 
Jerome Michael, to produce a new kind of criminal law casebook, 
one that dramatically reduced the number of cases students had to 
read, substituting in their place bits of law review articles, 
paragraphs from major philosophical treatises, and statistical 
studies.63   
 To Wechsler’s mind, substituting outside materials for 
cases promised to change the way that students thought about law.  
Rather than learning to revere legal opinions, students would, 
Wechsler hoped, come to criticize them.64  Regularly, Wechsler 
included notes that prompted students to question the normative 
basis of judicial opinions, at times even mocking judicial deference 
to precedent and English common law.65  Though such an 
iconoclastic approach risked leaving students confused and 
arguably even unprepared for the criminal bar, Wechsler did not 
particularly care whether his students entered criminal practice or 
not.  In fact, the administration at Columbia joined him in 
discouraging students from becoming criminal lawyers, partly 
because the field tended to be low-paying, but also because 
defense attorneys tended to be associated with the criminal element 
and prosecutors tended to become politically compromised.66  
 Enter the modern criminal law casebook.  Seizing an 
opportunity to nudge criminal law away from practitioners and 
towards future “legislators” Wechsler published his book in 1940 
to widespread acclaim, dramatically – perhaps even tragically – 
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influencing an entire generation of law students.67  Foremost 
among such students was a young Navy veteran named Sanford 
Kadish who took Wechsler’s criminal law course in 1946 and, 
inspired by Wechsler’s law and society approach, then went on to 
produce his own, iconic, Wechsler-inspired text in 1962.68 
 Why are Kadish and Wechsler relevant to understanding 
the division between “common law” and “Model Penal Code” 
states?  From 1952 to 1962 Herbert Wechsler served as the 
Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
project, overseeing the creation of the code, a production that 
younger scholars like Kadish reverently emphasized in their 
casebooks.69  Completed in 1962, the MPC introduced a series of 
revisions to criminal law definitions that, presumably, had 
themselves come directly from the ancient common law of 
England.  In fact, the Model Penal Code’s Commentaries 
repeatedly referenced the “Common-Law Background” of 
American criminal law, using it as a foil for the innovations 
introduced by the MPC.70  To anyone unfamiliar with the statutory 
nuance of American criminal codes, the MPC Commentaries 
themselves made it logical to distinguish between MPC states and 
common law states, a divide that scholars like Kadish imported 
into their casebooks.  Though much of that law was itself codified, 
Kadish chose to refer to states that either did not adopt the Model 
Penal Code, or had yet to adopt it as “common law” – not code 
states.71 
    
 
 
II. THE MYTH OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE STATE 
 
 While thirty-four states adopted portions of the Model 
Penal Code, no state adopted all of it.72  Even states that adopted 
much of it – New York, Illinois, and Missouri all examples – 
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tended to amend MPC definitions with new legislation.73  Why?  A 
brief look at the archaeology of state codes indicates that those 
portions of the MPC which challenged local, cultural values tended 
to fail, while those sections that simply reiterated what many 
people already felt, tended to succeed, rendering so-called “MPC” 
states hybrid regimes that enjoyed some of the modern  
innovations provided by the MPC, yet retained distinctive aspects 
of older, more local law.74  
 To illustrate, one of the MPC’s most-heralded reforms was 
a recommendation that inchoate offenses, conspiracy, attempt, and 
so on, be punished just as harshly as completed offenses, a rule that 
coincided nicely with the instrumentalist view that individuals who 
attempted to commit crimes were just as dangerous as individuals 
who completed crimes.75  Yet, no state adopted the rule, indicating 
that voters were simply not willing to jettison traditional notions 
that individuals who completed crimes were more guilty than those 
who did not.76  Similarly, no states adopted the MPC’s elimination 
of the overt act requirement in conspiracies chargeable as first or 
second degree offenses.77  Traditionally, conspiracy required an 
agreement to commit a crime and an overt act in furtherance of that 
crime.78  However, in an attempt to ramp up controls for future 
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dangerousness, the MPC eliminated the overt act requirement for 
serious crimes, transforming the offense into an Orwellian exercise 
in thought control.79  While some scholars praised this ultra-
aggressive approach, all thirty-four states that adopted portions of 
the MPC balked.80  Even New York and Illinois, both of whom 
suffered longstanding problems with organized crime, rejected the 
MPC approach and held that an overt act need be proven for every 
grade of conspiracy, even the most serious.81 
 How can such digressions be rationalized?  One likely 
explanation is that state legislators felt the MPC’s innovations 
outstripped popular notions of how certain crimes should be 
punished.  In the case of inchoate crimes like conspiracy and 
attempt, for example, the MPC may simply have appeared too 
harsh. Though the MPC’s position was logically consistent with an 
emphasis on controlling dangerousness, its elevation of mental 
state above conduct appeared too much for legislators to accept, 
even for conspiracies that involved organized crime.  
 Conversely, when crimes involved children, the public 
seemed more eager for punishment than the MPC.  In a remarkable 
continuation of its emphasis on mental state, for example, the 
Model Penal Code allowed adults guilty of sleeping with minors to 
escape strict liability unless the child was ten years old or 
younger.82  Unwilling to provide sex offenders such relief, all 34 
MPC states rejected the Code’s statutory rape provision.83  As we 
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have seen, this very age had been contemplated by English law 
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and rejected by American 
common law states like North Carolina.84  Instead, states set the 
age of victims at 13 in some jurisdictions, and as high as 17 in 
others.85  For example, Missouri declared statutory rape chargeable 
to individuals who had intercourse with minors under fourteen 
years of age.86  Yet, a fourteen year old could, with the permission 
of a judge, enter into marriage and obviate the rule.87  This 
“marriage rape exemption” represented a direct reflection not of 
MPC treatmentism, but “a relic of the past,” a type of shotgun 
wedding provision that presumed “girls are sure to be better off 
with a husband to look after them rather than be subject to a life on 
welfare.”88  In fact, Missouri’s treatment of sexual offenses like 
statutory rape reflects precisely the kind of local, cultural 
specificity that students assigned either the MPC or English 
common law miss.   
 What larger lessons can be learned from looking at state 
rejections of MPC provisions on statutory rape, attempt, and 
conspiracy?  Simply because states adopted portions of the Model 
Penal Code did not mean that they adopted all of the Code, or even 
its most distinctive sections.  Further, denoting certain states MPC 
states only obfuscates the fact that even those states most open to 
the MPC remained, in the final analysis, hybrids.  Either they 
blended the MPC with older state codes, conflated state statutes 
with ancient English common law rules, or carved out their own, 
culturally distinct paths.   
 Another area where the MPC failed to convince state 
legislatures was murder.  Frustrated at state tendencies to reduce 
premeditation to an instant, the MPC’s drafters collapsed first and 
second degree murder into a single offense, triggered whenever a 
defendant “causes the death of another human being” purposely, 
knowingly, or “recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.”89  While the 
drafters retained some exceptions for the death penalty – all 34 
states that adopted portions of the MPC rejected the Code’s 
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recommendations, choosing instead to preserve the distinction 
between first and second degree. 
 Often, the decision to preserve and/or expand first degree 
murder reflected local politics.  New York provides an example.  
Out of all the states in the union that adopted portions of the Model 
Penal Code, New York should arguably have been the most pro-
MPC, if for no other reason than that New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller assigned Herbert Wechsler, the American Law 
Institute’s Reporter for the MPC, to serve on its Temporary 
Commission to Revise New York’s Penal Law.90  Though a 
supporter of the Model Penal Code, particularly reduction of 
murder to one degree, Wechsler remained acutely aware of the 
political pressures that voters exerted in New York, and 
subsequently tailored the code to local conditions.91  
 To illustrate, by 1961, New York was the last state in the 
Union to impose a mandatory death penalty for all cases of first 
degree murder.  While Wechsler opposed the death penalty as a 
matter of principle, he insisted that any move to alter first degree 
murder in New York required holding “public hearings” in order to 
build popular support for legal change.92  Wechsler’s interest in 
holding hearings reflected a democratic strain that ran through 
much of New York’s adoption of the Model Penal Code.  For 
example, at a Commission meeting on December 8, 1961, 
Wechsler warned that the “controversial” issue of the death penalty 
presented the Commission with a unique “problem” in that public 
attention to it far outweighed public interest in other aspects of the 
criminal law, notions of culpability, justification, and excuse for 
example.93  To avoid jeopardizing important reforms of the entire 
code, in other words, Wechsler advocated catering to popular 
opinion on the question of the death penalty “so as not to impede 
the progress of a lot of other work that will not be controversial.”94  
“My own view,” continued Wechsler, “is that a careful effort 
should be made to separate these issues to which the public and the 
legislature are to be really divided.”95   
 One issue that Wechsler feared might divide the public was 
the death penalty.  To avoid a political backlash on the penalty, he 
recommended that the Commission “educate the legislature and the 
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public,” particularly on issues of sentencing.96  He also lobbied in 
favor of retaining the death penalty, but only in two limited 
circumstances: 1) where a defendant killed a police officer “acting 
in the line of duty,” and 2) where the defendant murdered a prison 
guard.97  
 For the most part, such attention to moderate reform and 
popular reception worked, engendering little political resistance. 
“From both sides of the aisle today,” reported the New York Times 
on June 4, 1965, “were applause and lavish praise for the 
commission chairman, Republican Assemblyman Richard J. 
Bartlett.”98  Precisely because the Committee had been careful not 
to offend the public, even granting concessions to avoid backlash, 
it had been able to achieve substantive reform. 
 Yet, the vagaries of popular opinion remained.  Despite 
Wechsler’s careful attention to popular caprice, the Commission’s 
attempt to restrict the death penalty failed to withstand popular 
anger at criminals, particularly as crime rates began rising in the 
late 1960s.  In October 1968, for example, a legislative committee 
met in New York to decide whether to expand the scope of capital 
punishment.99  Senator Edward J. Speno, the committee chair, 
announced that “many legislators” in New York had received 
“heavy mail” urging an expansion of cases where the penalty 
applied.100  Much of this mail had been triggered by rising 
crime.101  When New York City Controller Mario Procaccino 
called for a “get tough” policy on crime during a public hearing in 
Manhattan, including reinstatement of the electric chair for 
murderers, audience members cheered.102  Conversely, “groans and 
cat-calls” inundated psychiatrist Henry Peckstein when he warned 
that “too much repressive legislation” could lead to a “fascist 
state.”103 
 In 1971, state legislators extended capital punishment to 
anyone who killed a corrections officer “while he is performing his 
official duties.”104  In 1973, New York City mayoral candidate 
Mario Biaggi called for the execution of “hired assassins,” “those 
responsible for the killing of a witness to a serious crime,” and 
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those who committed murder during a “rape, robbery, or 
kidnapping.”105  In 1977, such a law passed both the House and 
Senate, only to be vetoed by New York Governor Hugh Carey.106  
Four years, and four vetoes later, the issue remained electric, this 
time with New York Mayor and gubernatorial candidate Ed Koch 
declaring that whether the death penalty deterred or not, it “is vital 
that society be allowed to express its moral outrage at wanton 
killing.”107  In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals entered the 
fray and overturned the state’s statute requiring capital punishment 
for offenders who killed while incarcerated, arguing that the 
mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.108 
 Despite the court’s ruling, popular initiatives to expand the 
death penalty continued into the 1980s.  In 1989, a democratic led 
assembly voted to restore the penalty in cases of murder-for-hire, 
murder of police officers, murder of witnesses, or murder in the 
course of a violent crime.109  Governor Cuomo vetoed the law, 
declaring that even though life had become “ugly and violent” in 
New York, capital punishment constituted little more than an “act 
of vengeance.”110  Frustration with Cuomo’s anti-death penalty 
stance contributed to the 1994 election of George Elmer Pataki, the 
first Republican Governor in twenty years.111  Pataki campaigned 
on a promise to expand the death penalty, something that no New 
York governor had done since 1977.112  On March 7, 1995, he 
finally succeeded in reinstating the electric chair – three decades 
after the Temporary Commission had tried to eliminate it – with a 
new law creating ten separate instances where death was 
appropriate. 113 
 Just as the political battle seemed over, the courts 
intervened.  In 2004, New York’s highest court invalidated 
Pataki’s law on the grounds that it unconstitutionally pressured 
jurors into choosing the death penalty by warning them that 
offenders who did not get executed might be paroled.114  Though 
Pataki moved quickly to amend the statute, he met stiff resistance 
in the State Assembly, now controlled by Democrats who were 
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softening on the issue.115  According to Democratic 
Assemblywoman Helene E. Weinstein, initially a supporter of 
capital punishment, “[m]y vote 10 years ago was 10 years ago.”116  
Since then, argued Weinstein, “new information, important 
information, about DNA testing” and “about innocent people being 
convicted” had emerged, changing her mind.117  Though she did 
not mention the program by name, Weinstein’s allusion to DNA 
testing referred to the Innocence Project, a program founded by 
law professors Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld to show that a 
surprising number of death row inmates were innocent of their 
crimes.118   
 As the above section indicates, battles over the death 
penalty in New York provide a glimpse into just how closely 
popular politics, statutory law, and judicial opinions operate to 
influence criminal law reform.  Though support for the Model 
Penal Code remained high in the state, popular politics won out, 
influencing the state’s treatment of first degree murder.  
Recovering some of the political wrangling that went into the 
reform of these offenses helps complicate the notion of the Model 
Penal Code state, showing how the Code was itself altered by local 
norms and legislative decree.   
 Another area of the Model Penal Code roundly rejected by 
states, but also related to homicide, was the elimination of felony 
murder.  The Model Penal Code rejected the concept of felony 
murder, replacing it with homicide “committed recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life,” a condition that was “presumed” if the actor was 
engaged in robbery, rape, arson, burglary, or kidnapping.119  Most 
states refused to follow the MPC on this point, preserving the 
separate crime of felony murder.120  
 Some states even went so far as to preserve felony murder 
in cases where a non-violent felony was at issue.121  This was the 
case in Missouri – an MPC state – where literally “any felony” 
might trigger the state’s felony murder provision.  In 1926, a court 
found the illegal manufacture of whiskey to be a sufficient 
predicate for felony murder, and in 1975 the Supreme Court of 
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Missouri found stealing to be a sufficient predicate felony.122  
Also, Missouri considers felonies that actually cause the death of 
victims – and are therefore barred from being predicate felonies in 
other states due to what is known as the “merger doctrine” – 
legitimate triggers for felony murder.123  An example occurred in 
2001, when a defendant was successfully charged with felony 
murder for unlawfully using a firearm against a victim, the 
unlawful use of a firearm qualifying as the underlying felony.124  
The State Court of Appeals literally “abrogated” the merger 
doctrine, holding that in cases where defendants’ “assaultive acts” 
resulted in death, those assaultive acts could themselves be 
considered predicate felonies.125  Even though this led to an 
arguably “absurd result” namely the possibility that someone could 
be convicted of “both murder and the assault giving rise to the 
murder, as a separate felony” Missouri courts held fast to their new 
common law rule.126   
 Almost as unpopular as the MPC’s elimination of felony 
murder was its modification of the necessity defense.127  At 
common law, necessity could be invoked in rare cases where a 
defendant committed a crime to prevent the occurrence of a greater 
harm that the defendant did not herself cause.128  The MPC 
expanded this defense, allowing defendants to take it even if they 
had inadvertently caused the greater harm.129 The MPC also 
allowed the defense to apply to a broad, relatively undefined 
number of “harm[s] or evil[s],” opening the door to myriad 
scenarios that most courts and legislatures would ultimately reject, 
including for example allowing for the theft of food in cases where 
a defendant’s children were hungry.130  Partly for these reasons, 
only two of the total 34 MPC states adopted its version.131 
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 Sometimes states adopted the MPC but changed it, adding 
provisions that ultimately undermined its strength.132  This was the 
case in Illinois, where the state legislature gradually added mental 
states to the MPC’s purpose, knowledge, recklessness, negligence 
formula.  By 2007, it had added “having reason to know,” 
“reasonably should know,” “willfully,” “maliciously,” 
“fraudulently,” and “designedly.”133  Though trivial, such 
modifications ultimately reflected a much larger trend, namely a 
tendency on the part of state legislatures across the country to alter 
key provisions of the MPC once it had been adopted.  As we have 
seen, this emerged in the context not simply of mental states, but 
inchoate offenses, accomplice liability, statutory rape, felony 
murder, first degree murder, and necessity.  In the next section, we 
will see how even those aspects of the MPC faithfully preserved by 
state legislators became manipulated by courts.  
 
 
 
III. The New Common Law 
 
 While legislative modifications to the MPC are well-
known, less studied are efforts that courts have made to alter MPC 
definitions.  Yet, most states that adopted portions of the MPC 
have almost half a century of case law interpreting model penal 
code provisions.  This new common law remains one of the least 
studied aspects of criminal law today, even though it impacts both 
the general and special parts of most state criminal codes. 
 For example, one of the Model Penal Code’s greatest 
contributions to criminal law is often considered to be the 
culpability provisions enumerated in its general part.134  Prior to 
the drafting of the Code, states employed a variety of poorly 
defined terms to denote mental state, including malice, mens rea, 
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willfulness, scienter and “general intent.”135  To clarify what, 
precisely, such terms meant, the MPC divided mental state into 
four presumably straightforward categories: purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence.136  Whether a defendant possesses 
one particular mental state over another could have significant 
consequences.  For example, if a defendant “unlawfully confines” 
a victim with the purpose of facilitating the commission of a 
felony, then that defendant could be charged with kidnapping, a 
“felony of the first degree,” while if they simply restrain someone 
the appropriate charge would be false imprisonment, a 
misdemeanor.137  
 Yet, as precise as the MPC’s delineations of mens rea are, 
state courts across the country have done much to muddy them, 
allowing jurors to impose culpability on defendants regardless of 
their actual thoughts.  The primary vehicle for this has been a 
common law rule that a defendant’s mental state can be imputed 
through “the natural and probable consequences” of her actions.138  
While MPC architect Herbert Wechsler recognized that such a 
doctrine may be “the only way of proving intent” in some cases, he 
bridled at judicial overuse of the theory, particularly in cases where 
jurors were given a choice of possible mental states.139  “Since a 
particular crime must actually be intended,” warned Wechsler, “the 
charge must be precise and must not permit the jury to convict the 
actor on one of several mental states.”140  Yet, this is precisely 
what courts across the country have done; reducing the Model 
Penal Code’s narrow tailoring of mental states to a loose menu of 
options that jurors can pick and choose from to get a conviction.141   
 New York provides an example.  After an “all-night St. 
Patrick’s Day Celebration” on Long Island in 1987, a former New 
York City Police officer shot and killed one of his colleagues.142  
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Though the officer could not explain or even remember why he 
killed his victim, he was charged with intentional murder (second 
degree in New York), depraved heart murder (requiring the lower 
mental state of extreme recklessness), and, at the judge’s request, 
manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of 
intentional murder and manslaughter in the second degree as a 
lesser included offense of depraved heart murder.143  Just as 
Wechsler warned, jurors found themselves suddenly able to choose 
from a smorgasbord of mental states, undermining the Model Penal 
Code’s imperative that a defendant’s state of mind be matched 
with a single crime.144 
 Accomplice liability marks another area where courts have 
tended to veer away from the MPC’s culpability provisions.  While 
the MPC made it clear that an accomplice needed the mental state 
of purpose, thereby rejecting the natural and probable 
consequences rule, courts in several states have gone the other 
way, allowing mental states to be imputed based on the natural and 
probable consequences of the accomplice’s actions.145  Even states 
that initially came out against applying the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine to accomplices have since developed new, 
judicially-created parallel theories that accomplish the same end.146  
For example, just as Missouri courts declared that they would not 
impute mental state based on the natural and probable 
consequences of an accomplice’s actions, so did new courts hold 
that a defendant is responsible for “those crimes which he could 
reasonably anticipate would be a part of that conduct.”147 
 Other common law rules survived in so-called MPC states 
as well, dramatically altering many of the MPC’s provisions. 
Again, murder in New York provides an example.  At common 
law, defendants who intentionally killed their victims could assert 
a partial defense if they suffered from a “heat of blood or passion” 
or were “greatly provoked.”148  Classic common law examples of 
such provocation included mutual combat brought on by a “sudden 
quarrel,” catching “another in the act of adultery with [one’s] 
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wife,” and retaliation for having one’s “nose pulled.”149  The 
defense could be claimed so long as the defendant did not have 
“sufficient cooling time for passion to subside and reason to 
interpose.”150 
 To distinguish itself from the common law, the MPC 
rejected the language of sudden passion, opting instead for 
“extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”151  Pursuant to this 
language, the Code did not require “that the actor’s emotional 
distress” come from “some injury, affront, or other provocative act 
perpetrated upon him by the deceased.”152  Instead, it did away 
with “a host of more or less hard and fast common law rules 
defining the scope of the provocation defense.”153  As it did away 
with such rules, however, the MPC also failed to provide clear 
guidance on what, precisely, constituted extreme emotional 
disturbance. This left a considerable amount of interpretation, if 
not outright law-creation, up to New York courts. 
 In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals decided an early 
case, New York v. Patterson, involving the extreme emotional 
disturbance offense, noting that “[t]he opportunity opened for 
mitigation differs significantly from the traditional heat of passion 
defense.”154  Citing the Model Penal Code Commentaries, the 
court asserted that the new emotional disturbance language did not 
limit the defense to instances where “a defendant, provoked, acts 
‘under the influence of some sudden and uncontrollable 
emotion.’”155  To elaborate, the court abandoned the old 
requirement that no cooling time could pass between the 
provocation and the act, holding instead that precisely because “a 
significant mental trauma” might have influenced the defendant’s 
thought processes “for a substantial period of time,” any length of 
time could pass and the defendant could still claim the defense.156  
 Precisely because New York’s Penal Code made no 
mention of cooling time, Patterson quickly became legal doctrine 
in the Empire State.  Four years later, for example, the New York 
Court of Appeals again dealt with an emotional disturbance case, 
citing Patterson as evidence of the “distinction between the past 
and present law of mitigation.”157  “In Patterson,” asserted the 
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court in People v. Casassa, an act arising from extreme emotional 
disturbance did not have to be “spontaneously undertaken.”158  On 
the contrary, “it may be that a significant mental trauma has 
affected a defendant’s mind for a substantial period of time, 
simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably 
coming to the fore.”159 
 Even as Casassa cited Patterson for the new common law 
rule that cooling time did not apply, so too did Casassa develop a 
rule of its own, namely that the emotional disturbance in question 
had to have an objectively reasonable explanation.  This holding 
settled an ambiguity in the statutory language of the MPC which 
provided a mitigating defense so long as the “defendant acted 
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which 
there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness 
of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the 
defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant 
believed them to be.”160  Though the statute’s call to focus on 
circumstances “as the defendant believed them to be” could be 
read as a subjective standard, the court found an equally plausible, 
objective reading.  “Whether the language of this statute requires a 
completely subjective evaluation of reasonableness,” mused Judge 
Jasen, “is a question that has never been decided by this court.”161   
Conceding that the MPC hoped to do away with “the rigid rules 
that have developed with respect to the sufficiency of particular 
types of provocation, such as the rule that words alone can never 
be enough,” the court held firm to the view that “[t]he ultimate test, 
however, is objective.”162 
 Over the course of the next two decades, the New York 
Court of Appeals assembled a collection of cases illustrating 
precisely how and when the defense of extreme emotional 
disturbance might apply – all arguably necessary reading for 
students interested in comprehending the doctrine.  To take just a 
few examples, the court held that an instruction was not warranted 
in a case where a victim put his hand on a defendant’s plate of 
food, but was warranted when a victim mocked a defendant’s 
inability to get an erection, overturning the traditional rule that 
words alone could not constitute provocation.163  Indeed, judicial 
interpretations of what did and did not constitute sufficient 
provocation provided something of a triptych into community 
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norms in New York, distinguishing actions that impugned cultural 
artifices like masculinity from mere annoyances.    
 Though criminal law casebooks often cite classic common 
law examples of provocation – mutual combat, catching spouses in 
bed with others, and so on – none discuss the manner in which 
courts have created new categories of voluntary manslaughter that 
coincide with the MPC.  Nor, for that matter, do casebooks explain 
how courts in MPC states have actually resurrected older 
categories that undermine the Code.164  For example, even though 
the Arkansas legislature adopted the MPC’s “extreme emotional 
disturbance” language, Arkansas courts quickly took the doctrine 
in a very different direction from the Empire State, returning it to 
its pre-MPC guise.165  Rather than follow New York’s 
abandonment of old, common law terms like provocation, 
Arkansas judges re-inserted provocation into its new defense.166  
“We have held repeatedly,” noted the Arkansas Supreme Court in 
2005, “that in order for a jury to be instructed on extreme-
emotional disturbance manslaughter, there must be evidence that 
the defendant killed the victim in the moment following some kind 
of provocation, such as ‘physical fighting, a threat, or brandishing 
a weapon.’”167  
 Further, Arkansas adopted the long-standing rule that the 
killing had to occur before a significant cooling time could pass, a 
point rejected by the MPC.168  Even though Arkansas continued to 
use the term “extreme emotional disturbance,” in other words, state 
courts had effectively resurrected the old common law provocation 
defense.  This, ironically, was the new common law rediscovering 
old forms.  
 Other examples of judicial law creation emerged in 
Pennsylvania.  After joining the Model Penal Code in eliminating 
the language of consent from its rape statute, for example, 
Pennsylvania reduced rape to instances where defendants engaged 
in sexual intercourse “by forcible compulsion.”169 State courts then 
proceeded to enumerate a variety of circumstances not anticipated 
by the MPC in which forcible compulsion might apply.170  To take 
just a few examples, Pennsylvania courts found forcible 
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compulsion when a defendant who enjoyed his victim’s trust and 
confidence employed “emotional exploitation” and when a father 
employed “psychological coercion” by engaging in sexual 
intercourse with his daughter after showing her sexually explicit 
photographs.171  Neither case involved either the use or threat of 
force, indicating that courts were pushing the law of rape in new 
directions, away from MPC and common law rules rooted in 
resistance, and towards standards more sensitive to disparate 
power relations.  Along these lines, Pennsylvania courts also found 
forcible compulsion when a therapist abused his authority over a 
patient and an employer abused his authority over an employee.172   
 Even as Pennsylvania courts exploded the force rule, other 
states developed judicial innovations in the law of rape as well, 
including a doctrine that obviated the force requirement in cases 
where accomplices were involved.173  This rule manifest itself 
most clearly in Missouri, where a court encountered a case 
involving two men, A & B, who burglarized a house.174  While A 
(the defendant) searched a portion of the house, B discovered a 
female and warned her not to make any trouble on pain of instant 
death.175   B then left the victim alone in a room and went to tell A 
of her presence, at which point A went to the room where the 
victim was and had sexual intercourse with her – without using 
either force or threats.176  Though A did not employ forcible 
compulsion, a Missouri appellate court held that he could be 
convicted nevertheless because he had, ultimately, been 
responsible for B terrifying the victim.177 
 Just as Missouri and Pennsylvania courts altered the MPC’s 
law of rape, so too did other states alter the MPC’s approach to 
accomplice liability.  Across the river from Missouri, for example, 
Illinois courts retained the merger doctrine but revised the MPC’s 
accomplice liability language.  While the MPC made it clear that 
the natural and probable consequences of one party’s actions could 
not be used to implicate others, Illinois courts found an alternate 
rule that achieved a similar end.  Rather than natural and probable 
consequences, Illinois judges turned to a judicially constructed 
doctrine known as the “common design rule” that held “where two 
or more persons engage in a common criminal design,” then “any 
acts in furtherance thereof committed by one party are considered 
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to be the acts of all parties to the common design.”178  Though 
reminiscent of the MPC’s conspiracy language, the doctrine 
actually lent itself to a dramatic reformulation of accomplice 
liability, particularly since “the State need only prove the accused 
had the specific intent to promote or facilitate a crime.”179  For 
example, in a case styled People v. Reid, the defendant agreed to 
participate in a robbery only to discover that one of his 
accomplices secretly intended to shoot the victim.180  While under 
the MPC the defendant would not have been held responsible for a 
crime he did not anticipate, the Illinois appellate court held 
explicitly that it was not “necessary” for the prosecution “to prove 
the accused had the specific intent to promote or facilitate the 
crime with which he is charged.”181  Instead, all the state had to 
show was that the accomplices had agreed to commit “a crime,” 
meaning any crime that might be framed as part of a common 
plan.182 
 While Illinois adopted the common design rule, Maine 
courts modified the MPC in another way, by resurrecting natural 
and probable consequences as a way of establishing accomplice 
liability.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine sanctioned this 
approach in State v. Linscott, a 1987 case involving the conviction 
of an accomplice who claimed to lack the requisite mental state for 
murder.183  According to the defendant, he joined three other men 
in what he believed was going to be the robbery of a local cocaine 
dealer, only to learn that one of his accomplices secretly planned to 
murder the victim.184  Though the court believed defendant lacked 
the requisite intent for murder, it nevertheless invoked the doctrine 
of “foreseeable consequence[s],” holding that mental state could be 
imputed based on the natural and probable consequences of 
defendant’s actions, and a probable consequence of an armed 
robbery was murder.185  While the MPC expressly rejected such an 
approach, and Maine otherwise adopted much of the MPC, this 
particular provision marked a departure from the code by state 
courts.  
 Missouri courts performed a similar revision on the Model 
Penal Code’s definition of conspiracy.  While the Missouri 
legislature adopted the MPC requirement that overt acts be 
required to establish all but the most serious of conspiracies, 
Missouri courts quickly loosened this requirement to include the 
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absence of action.  For example, in a 1984 case styled State v. 
Mace, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held 
that while “proof must be adduced that an overt act” occurred, 
there was actually “no requirement” that such an act be “a physical 
act.”186  Indeed, the court even went so far as to hold that “mere 
silence” counted as an overt act, rendering the rule near 
meaningless.187 
 Missouri courts performed a similar revision on the Model 
Penal Code’s definition of knowledge.  While the Model Penal 
Code limited knowledge to instances where a defendant is 
“practically certain” that his conduct will produce a certain result, 
the appellate court for the Western District of Missouri expanded 
this definition to include a defendant who shot his “best friend” 
after pointing and firing what he believed to be an empty handgun 
at him.188  Prior to the killing, defendant welcomed victim to his 
home, “talked, joked, and laughed” with him, and then accepted 
victim’s offer to inspect a handgun that victim had concealed under 
his shirt.189  Defendant emptied several rounds from the gun’s 
chamber and, believing the gun to be empty, pointed it in jest at his 
friend and pulled the trigger three times, killing him on the third.190  
Though defendant’s conduct indicated that he did not actually 
know the gun was loaded, and therefore was negligent, the 
Missouri court presumed that the defendant and the victim were 
engaged in a game of “Chicken” and that the defendant therefore 
knew he would kill his friend when he pulled the trigger.191  
However, even if the defendant had been engaged in a game of 
chicken, this does not necessarily mean that he knew he was going 
to kill his friend.  At best, he knew there was a substantial risk that 
he might kill his friend, rendering his mental state one of 
recklessness.  After all, while the Model Penal Code provides for a 
finding of knowledge where a defendant “is aware of a high 
probability” that something exists, this expansion is obviated in 
cases where a defendant “actually believes that it does not exist,” 
as the defendant in Johnston likely did when firing a gun at his best 
friend.192  Perhaps eager to deter citizens of Missouri from 
engaging in similar games in the future, however, the appellate 
court sanctioned a substantial departure from the MPC’s definition 
of knowledge, allowing the jury to find knowledge in cases where 
defendants at best were aware of a risk.193 
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 In a manner that only highlights the extent to which courts 
employed “new” common law rules to transform the MPC, 
Missouri courts took a very different – but arguably equally 
heretical – tack in cases that involved defendants who implausibly 
maintained that they were not aware of the age of certain minors 
who joined them in criminal activity.194  For example, in State v. 
Hopkins, a Missouri appellate court ignored the Model Penal 
Code’s definition of knowledge and concluded that a defendant 
who purchased alcohol for a twelve year old and proceeded to 
drink alcohol with that twelve year old in his car was not guilty of 
second degree child endangerment.195  Though the MPC’s 
definition of knowledge – which the Missouri legislature adopted – 
clearly allowed for a conviction in such a case where a defendant 
was at the very least “aware of a high probability” that a certain 
attendant circumstance was true, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eastern District of Missouri held that the state had to prove that the 
defendant “actually knew the victim was under 17.”196  In arriving 
at this holding, the Eastern District relied on an earlier case that 
also let a defendant go free for not checking the age of a minor.197  
In that case, State v. Nations, the defendant hired a sixteen year old 
to dance at a nightclub without checking her age.198  Though 
convicted at the trial level for “knowingly” endangering the 
welfare of a child “less than seventeen years old,” the appellate 
court reversed, marking a dramatic departure from the Western 
District’s holding in the Russian roulette case that the defendant 
knew he had shot his best friend even though he had emptied 
several rounds from the chamber.  Obviously, both the shooter and 
the endangerers knew there was some probability their conduct 
might lead to a criminal result, yet the new common law treated 
the two types of defendant differently.  Why?  Perhaps Missouri 
courts wanted to send a stronger signal to those who toyed with 
lethal weapons than those who drank alcohol with children.  Or, 
perhaps Missouri courts wanted to signal to parents that they, and 
not the law, were ultimately responsible for supervising their 
progeny.  Regardless of the precise reason, Missouri’s new 
common law dramatically complicated the Model Penal Code’s 
otherwise straightforward definition of knowledge.  
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 Rather than an outlier, Missouri proved representative of 
nearly all thirty-four states that adopted the MPC.199  In each of 
these states, courts stepped in after the Code was adopted and 
altered key provisions.200 Such alterations – or what this article 
calls new common law – are largely ignored in the literature but, as 
we shall see in the next section, theoretically significant.   
 
 
IV. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
  
Criminal law scholars tend to downplay the significance of 
cases to understanding criminal law.201  Such animosity is nothing 
new, and in fact dates back to a surge of frustration with the 
common law that peaked in the 1930s.202  At the forefront of such 
critiques were legal realist scholars like Karl Llewellyn who 
believed that law should reflect social realities – not ancient 
doctrines – and should rely on empirical studies in social science 
for guidance.203  Though Llewellyn concentrated his reform efforts 
on rationalizing commercial law, his general animosity towards the 
common law was shared by scholars in the criminal law realm as 
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well, including Columbia law professor Herbert Wechsler.204  To 
Wechsler’s mind, the common law actually contributed to a narrow 
judicial mindset that threatened Roosevelt’s early, ambitious New 
Deal programs.205  
Wechsler’s pro-New Deal sentiment inspired him to join 
Columbia colleague Jerome Michael in drafting a new kind of 
criminal law casebook in 1940.206  Unlike older books, Joseph 
Henry Beale’s classic 1890s text among them, Wechsler and 
Michael deliberately reduced the number of cases in their book, 
substituting in their place extensive notes that drew from law 
review articles, philosophical treatises, and social science 
studies.207  To Wechsler’s mind, such an approach helped to 
produce a new kind of student, one liberated from the “closed-
system” approach of the common law, and eager to think critically 
of the manner in which social science could contribute to racial 
legal reform.208 
In part because of the success of his casebook, Wechsler 
received an invitation from the American law Institute to serve as 
Reporter for a new, model criminal code that would draw heavily 
from advances in social science to reform ancient common law 
doctrines.209  Wechsler and Michael had already sought ways to 
improve such doctrines, particularly in the law of homicide, hoping 
to rationalize redundancies, tailor sentencing, and clarify confusing 
common law rules.210  Over the course of the next decade, from 
1952 to 1962, the American Law Institute relied on a series of 
experts to reform almost every area of criminal law, substituting 
the common law’s traditional emphasis on retribution and 
community conscience with a more scientific emphasis on 
treatmentism and the reduction of criminal harm.211  Though 
Wechsler himself retained an interest in the utility of desert, many 
of the Code’s new provisions reflected a very different approach, 
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located far from local community sentiment, usages, and 
customs.212 
 Though at first glance similar to Llewellyn’s UCC, the 
Model Penal Code’s rejection of local custom made it and the 
Uniform Commercial Code profoundly different.  Despite his 
interest in modernism, for example, Karl Llewellyn kept local 
custom at the center of his mind, staying true to the realist maxim 
that legal reform should draw inspiration not from abstract 
principles but “the trials of experience.”213  Though just as opposed 
to the common law as Wechsler, in other words, Llewellyn 
retained an appreciation for the fact that judge-made law also 
included within it significant “folk artifacts,” and useful “working 
rules” that had “proven their worth over time.”214  This led him to 
articulate a distinction between the “grand” or valuable portions of 
the common law, from the less valuable “formal” aspects.215   To 
Llewellyn’s mind, it was the legislator’s job to “take the good, 
practical folkways” of the common law, meanwhile rejecting its 
“outmoded” facets.216  
Central to Llewellyn’s belief in the value of folkways was 
the discipline of anthropology, a field that inspired one of his best 
known works, The Cheyenne Way.217 In that book, Llewellyn 
extolled those aspects of tribal behavior that reflected sensible 
practices developed from the ground-up, arguing that written law 
worked best when it tracked local custom.218  To Llewellyn’s 
mind, the business community reflected another type of tribe, like 
the Cheyenne, that had established its own customs governing 
commercial transactions, an insight that guided his preparation of 
the Uniform Commercial Code.219 
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By contrast, the drafters of the MPC downplayed the 
significance of folkways to criminal law reform.220  Rather than 
presume that criminal law should be “what judges do” – a Realist 
maxim – the ALI drafters spent considerable amounts of time 
focused on what judges had done wrong, and what real, expert-
driven reform should look like.221  Though ALI Reporter Herbert 
Wechsler kept custom in mind, the inspiration for much of the 
MPC lay not in local practice but behavioral science – 
psychological and sociological work done on treatmentist goals 
like rehabilitation and deterrence.222  
The MPC’s break from the common law sparked a sea-
change in criminal law pedagogy as scholars moved to present the 
MPC not as an evolved form of the common law, or even a 
repository for the best of common law rules, but a rational, 
ultimately superior alternative.223  Not long after the MPC was 
completed, for example, a new generation of criminal law scholars 
led by Sanford H. Kadish began drafting casebooks heavily 
influenced by Wechsler and Michael, even to the point that they 
included the MPC at the end of their books as an example of a 
rational code that could be compared to archaic common law.224  
 Once states began to actually adopt portions of the MPC, 
criminal law scholars then began to divide the country into two 
kinds of states: those that adopted the MPC, and the rest.225  
Underlying this practice was, of course, a larger set of normative, 
even political assumptions about the nature of criminal law 
generally.  To the younger, reform-minded generation, MPC states 
were in fact more progressive, more scientific, and less likely to 
cave to popular demands for retribution and revenge.226  Such 
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states inspired the hope that a rational criminal code could be 
implemented across the country, one that ignored irrational calls 
for increased punishment, execution, and redundant offenses.227   
Yet, between innovations in behavioral science and legal 
change rested an entire strata of thought far removed from the 
realm of rational inquiry, a realm that Lawrence Friedman has 
since called “popular legal culture” inhabited by “popular ideas, 
attitudes, values, and opinions” regarding law what the law is.228  
Acknowledging the importance of popular legal culture was not 
something that devotees of the MPC considered central, to their 
own detriment.229 One of the best examples of this was the failure 
of MPC proponents Sanford Kadish and Herbert Packer to reform 
California’s penal code.230  Asked by California’s Joint Legislative 
Committee to improve criminal law in the golden state, Kadish and 
Packer spent several years on the drafting of a new criminal code, 
importing many of the innovations recommended by the MPC.231  
Though many such reforms would likely have passed legislative 
muster, Kadish and Packer endorsed several changes that flew in 
the face of customary criminal law in California, including the 
decriminalization of certain sexual behaviors, the expansion of the 
insanity defense, and the liberalization of marijuana laws.232  When 
state Republicans read the commission’s recommendation that 
possession and sale of less than one pound of marijuana be 
considered a misdemeanor, for example, they reacted “with such 
emotional indignation that all avenues for a thoughtful interchange 
of points of view were quickly closed.”233  Not long thereafter, 
“the acting project director was informed by telephone that the 
chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee had discharged all of 
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the members of the staff and ordered the project halted at once.”234  
Though Kadish and Packer wrote a letter protesting the decision, 
no new commission was appointed and California’s criminal code 
remained largely unchanged for the remainder of the twentieth 
century. 235 
Though Kadish later blamed “conservatives” for killing 
criminal reform in California, he himself did little to make sure 
that the committee’s suggestions were in line with what most 
voters believed, even confessing that the academic members of the 
staff ran the committee meetings as “post-graduate seminars.”236  
Had Kadish and his colleagues approached such seminars in a 
more anthropological way, focusing on the local norms of 
California voters, they might have been able to develop strategic 
concessions – much like Wechsler did in New York – saving 
reform.237 
Sanford Kadish’s failure in California underscores the 
importance of conveying the link between culture and criminal law 
to students.  Though liberalizing marijuana laws may have 
appeared non-controversial at the time, code reformers failed to 
accurately assess the power of conservative politics in California in 
the 1960s, undoubtedly substituting liberal positions on marijuana 
use common in Berkeley and Palo Alto for more conservative 
positions in rural, working class demographics across the state.238  
Further, code reformers may have fared better had they remained 
more closely attuned to trends in state politics, particularly a 
pronounced shift towards conservatism mid-decade, as voters 
recoiled at urban rioting, anti-war protest, and Berkeley’s filthy, 
free-speech movement.239    
While criminal law courses can probably never incorporate 
the full scope of state and local politics into their syllabi, methods 
of emphasizing the link between criminal law and culture 
nevertheless remain.240  For example, one way to convey the link 
between law and culture is to delve into the particulars of state law, 
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showing how certain states adopted portions of the MPC, but 
rejected others.241  Another is to look at courts, focusing on how 
judicial opinions modified those sections of the Model Penal Code 
that were adopted.  True to its anthropological bent, the drafters of 
the UCC did just this, setting apart a special organ for publishing 
judicial modifications of the Code.242  However, nothing similar 
exists for the MPC, leaving most students blind to the manner in 
which it has interacted with local state cultures.  This has led to a 
problem that anthropologist Clifford Geertz identified with top-
down, philosophical approaches to studying society generally, 
namely the problem with extracting “the general from the 
particular” and then setting the particular “aside as detail, 
illustration, background, or qualification.”243  To Geertz, such 
moves yield a relatively narrow understanding of “the very 
difference we need to explore.”244 
Geertz’s attention to local difference warrants closer 
thought by criminal law scholars and teachers.  This is because 
students suffer at least two distinct harms when they are not 
provided with a clear view of how local culture impacts criminal 
law, including the MPC.  First, failing to instruct students on 
judicial modifications of the MPC, or what this article calls the 
new common law, renders them less prone to understanding what, 
precisely the law forbids, a problem that scholars like Paul H. 
Robinson have argued is a serous concern.245  Two, failing to 
instruct students on the new common law prevents them from 
seeing the critical role that criminal lawmaking can play in 
quieting community outrage, a phenomenon that criminal law 
scholars call the utility of desert.246  Though scholars revile 
redundant criminal provisions, for example, such provisions are 
often important responses to particular moments of community 
outrage.247 As scholars Paul Robinson and Michael T. Cahill note, 
for example, “[i]f there is a series of drive-by shootings, or a 
particularly scary home invasion case, or some carjackings, a 
common response is to create special offenses for each of these 
                                                 
241
 Chad Flanders, The One-State Solution to Teaching Criminal Law, OHIO 
STATE J. OF CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2010).  
242
 Bruce Frier, Interpreting Codes 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201 (1991). 
243
 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, AFTER THE FACT: TWO COUNTRIES, FOUR DECADES, ONE 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 40 (1995). 
244
 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, AFTER THE FACT: TWO COUNTRIES, FOUR DECADES, ONE 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 40 (1995).  
245
 Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 729 (1990).  
246
 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453 (1997); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
343, 359 (1983).  
247
 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453 (1997).  
 41
particular kinds of conduct, even though they are already fully 
criminalized and, where possible, prosecuted.”248  While both 
Robinson and Cahill find such behavior reprehensible, even they 
agree that the public are affected by such moves, arguably 
precluding average voters from doing even more serious damage. 
What, skeptics might ask, might voters do?  Citizens 
deprived of immediate responses to gruesome crimes may retaliate 
by electing tough-on-crime representatives who end up imposing 
harsher penalties on all offenders.249  Outraged citizens may also 
refuse to channel public funds into the defense of the accused, a 
serious problem for public defenders across the United States.250  
Though downplayed by criminal law scholars, in other words, the 
problem of voter outrage might actually be one of the most serious 
– yet underestimated – forces acting on America’s criminal justice 
system, even today.  
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 Though criminal law scholars continue to divide American 
jurisdictions into Model Penal Code and common law states, it is 
not clear that such divisions retain any real pedagogical value.  As 
this article has shown, no state in the Union continues to follow the 
ancient common law of England, nor does any state exist without a 
criminal code.  Indeed, out of the sixteen states that did not adopt 
the Model Penal Code – a move that has since relegated them into 
the common law category – none adhere to anything that might 
remotely be called English common law.  
 As we have seen, all common law states have long since 
codified their criminal law, reserving the enforcement of ancient 
common law crimes to “reception statutes.”251  Yet, the use of such 
statutes is exceedingly rare, confined to idiosyncratic, nineteenth-
century-era offenses like “being a common scold,” and “burning a 
                                                 
248
 Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can A Model Penal Code Second 
Save the States from Themselves 1 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L.  169, 171 (2003).  
249
 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for 
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 21, 22 (2007).  
250
 Limping Along, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 2007, at C10; Rights on 
the Verge of Collapse, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, March 19, 2006, at B2. 
Redundant codes may also provide opportunities to do justice.  For example, 
prosecutors in Missouri have the opportunity to charge defendants suspected of 
attempted killing with one of two crimes, either attempted murder or first degree 
assault.  Here, an attempted murder charge actually brings with it a lower 
penalty, meaning that prosecutors could satisfy community outrage by 
mentioning murder meanwhile reducing the penalty to sympathetic defendants 
by charging attempted murder. 
251
 See supra Part I.  
 42
body in a cellar furnace.”252  Archaic at best, these types of 
offenses hardly warrant the sustained attention of first year law 
students.253 
 Even the argument that certain states codified common law 
terms is hardly a justification for continuing the common law 
divide.254  As this article illustrates, most states have legislatively 
altered what might once have been considered common law 
offenses, creating an entirely new form of American criminal 
law.255  To take just a few of the most glaring examples, all 
American states save one (South Carolina) unanimously rejected 
British rules of homicide by dividing murder into degrees.256  All 
American states (including South Carolina), then went on to grade 
forcible felonies, independent of British sources.257  Such grading 
alone sets American criminal law apart, even making it a model for 
reforms later enacted in the United Kingdom.258   
 Further, classic common law terms like malice 
aforethought – the bane of first year criminal law students – 
suffered a dramatic decline in use in the United States over the 
course of the Twentieth Century, as states enacted their own, 
unique requirements of mental state.259  To date, only six states out 
of fifty continue to employ malice aforethought as an indicator of 
first degree murder, hardly enough to warrant sustained attention in 
criminal law courses, even at national schools.260  
 The same can be said of conduct and attendant 
circumstance rules.  To take just a few examples, conduct rules in 
classic common law crimes such as rape have been fundamentally 
altered in the United States, pushing them away from their English 
roots. 261  North Carolina – often considered one of the most 
traditional common law states – actually pioneered the 
liberalization of force requirements, allowing juries to infer force 
where only a threat existed. 262 
 The occlusion of cultural influences on criminal law is 
perhaps one of the greatest reasons for ending the mythology of the 
common law state.263  Perhaps no better example of this exists than 
California’s drive-by-shooting statute, designating anyone who 
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discharges a “firearm from a motor vehicle intentionally at another 
person outside of the vehicle” guilty of first degree murder.264  
Rather than a reflection of ancient common law doctrine, this 
statute represents a direct product of local criminal culture in 
California.265  Understanding the manner in which such local 
cultures impact criminal law is considerably more important to 
students than regurgitations of lost common law doctrines.  
 Just as the notion of the common law state has become 
increasingly anachronistic, so too has the conceit of the Model 
Penal Code jurisdiction.266  Though thirty four states adopted 
portions of the MPC, no state adopted all of it.267  Further, even 
those states that adopted significant sections of the Code still 
retained key aspects of their old laws.268  For example, the MPC’s 
recommendation that inchoate crimes be punished the same as 
completed crimes won no supporters.269  Neither did the MPC’s 
elimination of felony murder, nor its elimination of the overt act 
requirement for conspiracies to commit violent felonies.270 
 Much of the MPC’s failure to be adopted in toto was its 
incongruity with local, cultural values.271  One of the most glaring 
examples of this was the MPC’s treatment of statutory rape.272  
While MPC drafters felt comfortable reducing the age of victims to 
ten, state legislatures balked, refusing to let go of traditional 
attitudes regarding sex and children.273  
 The same held true for murder.  Convinced that qualifiers 
like premeditation and deliberation had been rendered meaningless 
by courts, MPC drafters de-graded the crime, only to find that first 
degree murder enjoyed a strong cultural currency.274  In state after 
state, legislatures rejected the Code’s mono-murder rule, retaining 
first degree murder for instances where the public demanded 
retribution, but second degree where defendants proved 
sympathetic.275  That no ostensible difference existed between the 
two, especially after premeditation and deliberation could be 
formed in an instant, proved, in the end, irrelevant.  
 Another locus of cultural resistance emerged around the 
death penalty.  Though personally opposed to capital punishment, 
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MPC Reporter Herbert Wechsler struggled to remain sensitive to 
popular support for the penalty while implementing the MPC in 
New York.276  As a result, New York’s Temporary Commission 
did away with the mandatory death penalty for all forms of first 
degree murder, but retained capital punishment for the rare cases 
where a defendant murdered a police officer or prison guard.277  
Though such concessions helped the revisions get through in 1972, 
state legislators proved unable to resist the temptation to add more 
exceptions to the rule every year after that, ultimately resulting in a 
triptych of local panics over contract killings, witness eliminations, 
judicial assassinations, and serial killer scares.278 
 Even as state legislatures proceeded to alter the Model 
Penal Code – as happened in New York – so too did state courts 
intervene, engendering nothing less than a new common law.279  
Perhaps the most devastating example of such law was the judicial 
elimination of the MPC’s expectation that prosecutors choose only 
one mental state per offense.280 As Herbert Wechsler put it, 
“[s]ince a particular crime must actually be intended, the charge 
must be precise and must not permit the jury to convict the actor 
on one of several mental states.”281  Judges disagreed.  In all thirty-
four states that adopted the Code, judges made a mockery of its 
MPC provisions by allowing prosecutors to proceed on a string of 
alternate possible mental states for the same offense.282 
 Judges also tinkered with the offenses themselves.283  In 
some MPC states, judges ignored the MPC’s order that accomplice 
liability not be ascribed based on the natural and probable 
consequences of an accomplice’s actions.284  In other states, judges 
simply created new rules that replaced natural and probable 
consequences, holding for example that accomplices could be 
found guilty for “those crimes which [they] could reasonably 
anticipate would be a part of that conduct.”285 
 When new rules did not work, judges returned to old ones, 
infusing the MPC with local law.  For example, even though 
Arkansas adopted the MPC’s notion of extreme emotional 
disturbance – a defense that replaced the heat of passion defense to 
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first degree murder – state judges quickly read old rules into the 
new law, requiring that there be no cooling off time between the 
provocation and the criminal act.286  Likewise, Illinois judges 
avoided the MPC’s order that accomplices not be held liable based 
on the natural and probable consequences of their actions, holding 
instead that “any acts in furtherance” of a “common criminal 
design,” constituted grounds for prosecution.287 
 Secreted over almost a fifty year period from 1962 to 2010, 
judicial modifications of Model Penal Code rules embody nothing 
less than a new common law.288  That casebooks and treatises do 
not focus on this law is mystifying.  However, even the most pro-
MPC criminal law theorists have begun to doubt the continued 
relevance of the code.289  According to criminal law scholar 
Markus Dubber, an ALI enthusiast, the Model Penal Code 
“belongs to a bygone era of American penal law.”290  Built on the 
twin theories of deterrence and treatment, Dubber continues, the 
Code “no longer enjoys the broad consensus it might have had in 
the 1950s.”291 
 Indeed it does not.  Though criminal law casebooks 
continue to present the MPC as an innovative, recent reform, it is 
rapidly approaching its fiftieth birthday.  At its inception half a 
century ago, it dovetailed nicely with prevailing trends towards 
modernism in law – a Benthamite moment during which rationality 
and science eclipsed history and anthropology.292  However, the 
devolution of the Model Penal Code in the latter half of the 
twentieth suggests that history and culture may be regaining lost 
ground.293  Indeed, the very criticisms of state codes advanced by 
scholars – that they are incoherent, sedimentary, even redundant – 
only confirms the Burkean critique of Bentham, namely that law 
itself cannot be understood by logical principles and scientific 
rules, but requires a close study of the history and culture of a 
particular society.294   
 Judicial opinions and state statutes provide just such a 
study.  Though criminal law scholar Markus Dubber has declared 
that “[t]he age of the common penal law is over,” and that “[p]enal 
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law is now made in codes by legislators, not in court opinions by 
judges,” even a cursory look at the manner in which courts have 
modified Model Penal Code provisions, or what this article calls 
the “new common law,” suggests this is incorrect.295  In fact, 
criminal law may be enjoying a renascence of new common law 
principles.  How?  While the mid-point of the Twentieth century 
witnessed a spike in modernist thought, of which the MPC was a 
product, the 21st Century looks to be a much different era, marked 
by a return to “historical and prescriptive modes of thought.”296  
Perhaps the biggest example of this is the recent surge of interest in 
empirical legal studies, an anti-philosophical inquiry bent on 
understanding the law as it is, not as it might, or even should be.     
Some of the MPC’s most fervent supporters understood 
this.  As much as Wechsler resisted the common law, for example, 
he never lost sight of local community norms and local, cultural 
values.  While serving on New York’s Temporary Commission to 
revise its Penal Law in 1963, for example, Wechsler consistently 
prodded the Committee to consider local attitudes.  Wechsler’s 
concern that criminal law coincide with community values is often 
lost in criminal law courses, particularly as teachers struggle to 
maintain the false dichotomy between common law and Model 
Penal Code states.  Setting aside this dichotomy is vital if criminal 
law scholars want to bring the course back to earth for their 
students.  Currently, simple comparisons between MPC and 
common law states obscure the manner in which statutory law and 
case law intertwine, even as they leave students missing the close 
relationship between criminal codes and local norms.  By contrast, 
focusing on the New Common Law enables students to see how 
even the most scientific of codes ultimately finds itself bending, 
and being bent, to suit judicial will.   
One final point is worth mentioning.  Though the impact of 
popular will on criminal statutes has been criticized by law 
scholars like Paul Robinson and William J. Stuntz, criminal law’s 
close tie to popular democracy remains unavoidable.297  Not 
emphasizing this to students can lead to dire results, among them a 
recurrent tendency to downplay the significance of local voters, 
and also to miss important cultural formations that may or may not 
make certain litigation strategies, or reform attempts, unworkable.  
Perhaps no better example of this exists than the failure of Model 
Penal Code enthusiasts like Sanford Kadish to successfully reform 
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California’s criminal code in the 1960s – a burden the state bears 
to this day.   
